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CHINA - TRADE OR HUMAN RIGHTS: WHICH COMES FIRST?
THE CANADIAN MODEL
Amos N. Guiorat and Samuel S. Riottett
I.

General Overview

The question of whether trade and human rights are naturally at odds has
been the subject of numerous articles, commentary, political discussion and
debate.' The issue was much discussed in 1974 when Senator Henry "Scoop"
Jackson (D-Wash) and Congressman Charles Vanik (R-Ohio) introduced the
so-called "Jackson-Vanik" Amendment, which denied normal trade relations
to countries with non-market economies and emigration restrictions. More
specifically, it addressed then Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev's
implementation of a tax that effectively prevented individuals studying in the
USSR from emigrating, even if it prevented them from returning to their
families.
The legislation's significance was clear: the human rights policies of a
potential trading partner may dictate the extent to which trade will occur. But
such policies are not always affected through legislation. The recent
"globalization" of the international community has resulted in more nations
making policy statements intended to cajole other states into improving their
human rights stance. Canada's recent dealings with China highlight just such
a policy.
On November 15, 2006, the Canadian Prime Minister, Right Honourable
Stephen Harper, made comments regarding Canadian trade with China that
became the subject of much discussion. Speaking to reporters about the two
t Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, The University of Utah.
tt Research Fellow, Institute for Global Security Law & Policy Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Class of 2007.
Remarks occurred at an event entitled The Economic Challenges of China:
US &
Canadian Responses, held on December 8 2006, and sponsored by Steptoe & Johnson, LLP
and Kaye Scholer.
1 See Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT'L &
CoMP. L. REV. 273 (2002); Amy J. McMaster, Human Rights at the Crossroads: When East
Meets West, 29 VT. L. REv. 109 (2004); Frank J. Garcia, The Global Market and Human
Rights: Trading Away the Human Rights Principle, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 51 (1999); see also
Human Rights in China, Statement of the WTO-Human Rights Caucus (Dec. 14, 2005),
http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/article?revision%5fd=26420&item%5fid=26396.
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countries' relationship while en-route to the Asia-Pacific Economic CoOperation Conference in Hanoi, Harper said, "I think Canadians want us to
promote our trade relations worldwide, and we do that, but I don't think
Canadians want us to sell out important Canadian values - our belief in
democracy, freedom, human rights.. .they don't want us to sell that out to the
almighty dollar...." 2 The Prime Minister's comments drew an immediate
response both supporting and attacking the policy. Comments critical of the
stance focused on two points: that it would negatively affect Canadian
business interests and that Canada was interfering in internal Chinese
politics. Favorable comments perceived the Prime Minister's stance as
principled - he refused to make financial interests paramount to the rights of
individuals.
The Prime Minister's comments, however, were not a complete surprise.
Canada has been involved in bilateral human rights discussions with China
since 1997, and in 1990, Canada sponsored the first resolution addressing the
status of human rights in China submitted to the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights.3

China initially responded to Prime Minister Harper's comments by
canceling proposed talks between the Prime Minister and China's president,
Hu Jintao, as the Chinese felt that Canada had made "irresponsible remarks
about internal affairs."4 Although the talks were later rescheduled, it was
clear that the Chinese were not pleased with Prime Minister Harper's
comments. Some observed that, "The Chinese have sent a very strong
message to Canada - that they're not very happy with the way the Tory
government has shown 5its support for the Dalai Lama and taken a stand on
human rights in China."
In the months that followed, the relationship between Canada and China
cooled. Though both nations indicated a desire to engage in dialogue they
expressed concerns over each other's conduct. In late January 2007, Canada
initiated what many viewed as a "softer" approach to China in the hopes of
reinvigorating their relationship.6 Commentators suggested that both parties

2 Officials: Harper may discuss human rights at APEC, CTV.ca News (Nov. 16, 2006),

http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20061116/apec-politics_061116?sna
me=&no ads [hereinafter Officials: Harper].
' Bilateral Human Rights Dialogue with China, Rights and Democracy (Jan. 2001),
http://www.dd-rd.ca/site/publications/index.php?lang=en&subsection=catalogue&id=l 290&
page=3.
Officials: Harper, supra note 2.
5 Id.

6 Michel Cormier, Canada's new 'China strategy', CBC News (Jan. 24, 2007),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/reportsfromabroad/cormier/20070124.html.
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expressed an interest in engaging in economic relations described as "cold on
the political side and warm economically. 7
The ensuing talks, however, seem to have achieved little. In early
February, China made what Canadians perceived as economic threats
intended to prevent Canada from pursuing its human rights agenda. Prime
Minister Harper responded by "reminding" China that Canada is the one with
the leverage; that is, Canada chooses whether to buy Chinese goods and, in
addition, Canada possesses oil China desires.
In determining to affect domestic policy of a sovereign nation, an
"activist" nation invites international and domestic criticism alike, the former
with respect to intervening in the domestic affairs of another sovereign, the
latter raising concerns regarding economic damage at home. Prime Minister
Harper has staked a clear position - whether this will be established and lead
to an economic backlash will be determined. Nevertheless, in direct contrast
to nations who turn either a "blind eye" or adopt a policy best described as a
"wink and a nod," the Canadian Prime Minister has articulated an
unequivocal position directly linking future trade between the two nations to
China's domestic human rights policy.
A. The Status of Human Rights in China
In examining the link between the two issues, it is important to both
describe and explain China's human rights policy and practices. After the
Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, human rights in China became a
concern of many nations of the world. While conventional wisdom holds that
human rights conditions improved dramatically in the aftermath of the
massacre, recent reports suggest that recently they have taken a turn for the
worse.8 Chinese legislation expected to reform hot-button issues, including
property ownership laws, the death penalty, and procedural rights, have lost
momentum or been shelved altogether. 9 Although civil rights movements are
found within China,' 0 they are small, largely underground, and their survival
is constantly threatened by government suppression and "in-house" conflict
regarding how best to effectuate the desired changes." The government has
7 Theophilos Argitis, Canada Seeks New Chinese Investments in Oil Fields, China

Institute (Jan. 16, 2007), http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/news.cfm?story=
55218.
8 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2007: EVENTS OF 2006, 258 (2007).
9 Id.
The most successful of these, known as the "Weiquan Movement," consists of a loosely
organized group of lawyers, academics, and journalists who pursue social justice through
litigation. Chinese authorities have targeted these individuals and many have been arrested on
charges including "inciting subversion" and "illegal business activities."
1" Joseph Kahn, Legal rivals seek to widen freedoms in China, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb.
10
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stepped up its restraint of individuals it perceives to be critical of its domestic
policies. Measures to implement restraint on individuals suspected of
political activism include incommunicado detention, electronic and physical
12
surveillance, and restriction on domestic and international travel.
Frequently the government's efforts to silence its critics occur without arrest,
thereby avoiding the unwanted international spotlight arrests can bring.
do occur, they are frequently the result of vague
Nevertheless, when arrests
13
crimes.
or ill-defined
China cites a recent constitutional amendment guaranteeing human rights
and private property ownership as indicative of the improving status of
human rights within the country. 14 Furthermore, China is a signatory to
numerous international human rights treaties. However, Human Rights
Watch speaks for many when it suggests that China "remains a one-party
state that does not hold national elections, has no independent judiciary, leads
the world in executions, aggressively censors the Internet, bans independent
trade unions, and represses minorities such as the Tibetans, Uighurs, and
Mongolians."' 5 Finally, attempts by international governments and nongovernmental organizations to approach the Chinese government regarding
these issues are frequently rejected due to China's perspective on sovereignty
in the context of international relations.
B. Sovereignty
The concept of sovereignty defies a single universal definition. At the
most general level, sovereignty refers to a political institution's supreme
authority over a territory. 16 The history of international law reveals that the17
concepts of human rights and sovereignty were frequently at odds.
Recently, however, a modern conception of sovereignty and human rights
has developed which maintains that the two principles have coalesced. As
one commentator argues, "The State that claims sovereignty deserves respect
only as long as it protects the basic rights of its subjects. It is from their rights
that it derives its own. When it violates them... the State's claim to full
24, 2007, http://www.iht.cornarticles/2007/02/24/africaweb-O225china.php?page=l.
12 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT, supra note 8, at 258.
13 Id.
14 Philip P. Pan, Chinese Leaders Speak of Reform, But How Quickly?, WASH. POST, Mar.
14, 2004, at A19.
15 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COUNTRY SUMMARY: CHINA, 1 (2006).

16 Stanford

Encyclopedia

of

Philosophy,

Sovereignty

(June.

18,

2003),

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/.
7 Vesselin Popovski, Sovereignty as Duty to Protect Human Rights, UN CHRON. ONLINE
EDITION, http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2004/issue4/0404pl6.html (last visited Mar. 19,
2008).
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sovereignty falls with it."' 8 The effect adopting such a definition has on
China's claim of sovereignty is clear.
One of the issues this article seeks to address is whether one nation's
attempt to shape another nation's domestic policy violates that state's
sovereignty. By directly correlating future Canadian-Chinese trade relations
to China's human rights policy, Prime Minister Harper has seemingly
attempted to interfere in Chinese domestic affairs. After all, the targets of
Canada's policy (and "victims" of China's human rights policy) are
exclusively Chinese nationals, not entitled to Canadian rights, guarantees, or
obligations.
While Prime Minister Harper's statements regarding the human rights
practices of China may be remarkable for their frankness, the Chinese have
become accustomed to such criticism. China's response to Harper, invoking
sovereignty, is representative of responses to previous, similar overtures by
other countries. China rejects modem conceptions of sovereignty and human
rights. 19 Although China has acceded to over seventeen UN-sponsored
human rights conventions, 20 it fails to recognize that the rights they contain
trump its sovereignty. According to one international law professor in China,
"Each country has the right to choose its own human rights development
model without interference from outside. To protect human rights is mainly
to prevent foreign invasion or occupation, racial discrimination and
international terrorist activities.,, 21 As a result of this perspective, past
attempts to influence Chinese human rights have largely failed. China
maintains that they meet the international requirements and additionally
admonish those who attempt influence by maintaining that their overtures
violate China's sovereignty.
C. InternationalTrade
Trade relationships are premised on a basic "give and take" between
partners - sometimes equal, other times not. An examination of China's
18 See Stanley Hoffman, The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention, 27 SURvIvAL 29
(1995).
19 See China's View of Sovereignty Significantly Different, China Policy Institute
International Conference on "China in the International Order: Integrating Views from
Outside-In and Inside-Out" The University of Nottingham (September 2006), available at
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/china-policyinstitute/events/China in-theInternationalOrderConferenceSep._2006.php.
20 Relations Between China and The UN Human Rights Mechanism, Permanent Mission
of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and other
International Organizations in Switzerland, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cegv/eng/rqrd/jblc/
t85088.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2008).

21 Are human rights higher than sovereignty? PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Mar. 17, 2006,

http://english.people.com.cn/200603/17/eng20060317_251529.html.
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economy suggests the following: in order to maintain the phenomenal growth
of the past three decades,22 China is heavily dependent on crude oil. While
China's presence in the Middle East has existed for some time, 23 only
recently has it had to engage in relationships with additional countries to
meet its oil needs.24 In 1992, China produced enough oil to completely
satisfy its domestic needs. Fifteen years later, China is notorious for its
ceaseless search for oil in every corner of the world and its willingness to
work with any government to satisfy the need.25 China's dependence on
imported oil is absolute; to meet it China has agreements with numerous
countries allowing China access to their oil. 26 In many cases these
agreements are with regimes that promote sub-standard human rights laws in
areas rife with security concerns, including Sudan, Nigeria, and Iran.
Additionally, in 2005, construction of an oil pipeline from the Caspian Shelf
in Kazahkstan to western China began.2 8 The pipeline ends in Xinjiang, an
autonomous region in western China. Nearly half of the region's people are
Uighur,2 9 a Muslim population frequently accused of terrorism by the
Chinese government.
While these are all of great importance to the Chinese, an additional
significant source of oil for them is the Alberta oil patch in Alberta,
Canada. 30 The patch's fossil fuels are in the form of oil sands, as opposed to
The average annual growth rate of China's GDP has reached nearly 10% over the last 25
years. Furthermore, based on China's official poverty line, the poverty rate in China dropped
from 33% in 1978 to less than 3% in 2004. See JIKUN HUANG, JUN YANG, & ScOTTr ROZELLE,
22

CHINA'S RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR AGRICULTURE AND FOOD
SECURITY IN CHINA AND THE REST OF THE WORLD, http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/ag088e/

AG088E03.htm (last visited March 3, 2007).
23 China and Saddam Hussein's Iraq sought the right to develop Iraq's oil patch together
though UN sanctions against Iraq prevented realization of this goal. See Peter S. Goodman,
Big Shift in China's Oil Policy, WASH. POST, July 13, 2005, at DOI.
24 China Needs More Oil, PEOPLE'S DAILY, July, 5, 2000, http://english.people.com.cn/
english/200007/05/eng200007O5_44761.html.
25 William Mellor and Le-Min Lim, China Drills Where Others Dare Not Seek Oil, INT'L
HERALD TRiB., Oct. 2, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/01/bloomberg/bxchioil.php.
26 These areas include central Asia, Latin America, South America, and Africa. See
Robert Collier, China on Global Hunt to Quench its Thirst for Oil, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON.,
June 26, 2005, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a12005/06/261MNG27DF8
HQI.DTL.
27 Matthew
Forney,
China's Quest for Oil, TIME,
Oct.
18,
2004,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501041025-725174,00.html.
8 China Starts Work on Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Mar.
25, 2005, http://english.people.com.cn/200503/25/eng20050325_178162.html.
29 Xinjiang
Uygur
Autonomous
Region,
People's
Daily,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/data/province/xinjiang.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2008).
10 See, Simon Romero, China Emerging as a U.S. Rival for Canada's Oil, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/23/business/worldbusiness/23canada.html?
pagewanted=l&ei=5088&en=bec439e3e7482281&ex=1261458000&partnerrssnyt.
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traditional crude oil, and this makes extracting oil more expensive. But the
recent surge in oil prices has made the deposit, projected to be the second
largest source of oil in the world behind Saudi Arabia, a coveted source of
energy. Many believe it is capable of satisfying much of the world's energy
needs for the next century. Not only has China expressed interest and
invested in the oil patch, it appears that one of the major oil sands developers
31
will use Chinese technology to extract crude from the sands.
Prime Minister Harper's position takes on enormous significance when
understood in the larger context of China's oil requirements. Linking human
rights violations to trade may potentially impact China's ability to procure
this additional oil. However, Canada's strength is predicated on China's
inability to develop sufficient oil sources elsewhere. As one prominent
Canadian business leader commented, "if the Chinese find sufficient oil
elsewhere, they'll drop us [Canada] immediately and take 'their ball'
elsewhere." 32 With China's numerous and expanding interests in the
international oil market, the issue becomes whether Canada has the requisite
leverage to influence human rights in China.
II. Analysis
Circumstances such as those outlined above bring to the forefront
questions regarding a nation's right to influence - some would say interfere
with - another nation's domestic policy. This issue requires analyzing the
limits and extent of sovereignty and will be discussed in section A below. An
analysis of whether Canada's policy is effective and the criteria for
determining such effectiveness will be discussed in section B. Furthermore,
as the discussion cannot and does not take place in a political vacuum, an
examination of factors that determine a nation's domestic and foreign
relations is inherent to the analysis; this will be the focus of section C.
Finally, in examining the issue from an integrative perspective, one of the
fundamental questions is what external factors affect the human rights-trade
relationship; this issue will be the focus of section D. The conclusion will
present recommendations regarding the articulation and implementation of a
policy, based on law that enables - or seeks to enable - a sovereign to
interfere in the domestic affairs of another sovereign.

31 See Andrew Leonard, Canada's Oil Sands Industry: Made in China?,
http://www.salon.com/tech/htww/2006/12107/china-oil-patchlindex.html (last visited March
30, 2008).
32 Private conversation with one of the authors.
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A. Limits and Extent of Sovereignty
The first issue to address is whether Canada's policy potentially infringes
on China's sovereignty. The sovereignty analysis can best be summarized as
follows: though Canada has not engaged in an "armed attack,, 33 the Prime
Minister directly sought to both influence Chinese internal politics and tacitly
threatened to deprive China of a much needed resource. While Harper's
policy would seem to suggest interference in Chinese sovereignty, unlike
armed interference, the Chinese are free to ignore Canada's policy. Since
many propose that sovereignty is simply the ability to make a choice free of
coercion,34 and China is free to choose to trade with Canada, then Canada has
not infringed on Chinese sovereignty.
But China responded to Harper's comments by arguing that Canada
violated its sovereignty. Such a response is problematic for a number of
reasons, the least of which is that Canada has taken no concrete steps
regarding the effects China's human rights standards will have on its
relationship with Canada. At this point there are no circumstances that make
such statements coercive. Rather, Prime Minister Harper simply made a
public statement he believed represents a common concern of Canadian
citizens, namely a desire to protect human rights. At this point, no legislation
has been passed that would limit Canadian involvement with China at any
level. Absent any concrete act that mandates China alter its behavior, China's
response seems premature and reactionary. It certainly cannot claim that
Harper's opinion in and of itself violates its sovereignty. But the question
remains: at what point could Harper's comments represent an infringement
on China's sovereign right to conduct its internal affairs as it sees fit?
The question becomes more interesting in the event that Canada proposes
and passes legislation that does curtail its relationship with China. For
example, Canada may decide to pass legislation that makes the extent of its
trade with China dependant on China improving it human rights practices.
Presently, Canada maintains a substantial trade deficit with China; simply
put, this means Canada spends more money on Chinese goods than China
spends on Canadian goods. Thus, any Canadian law predicating its trade with
China on Chinese human rights practices would, at a most basic level, limit
the amount of Chinese goods entering Canada. While this would likely affect
the daily lives of millions of Canadians, the question of whether this would
have any measurable affect on China's economy is less clear.
China has indicated that its trade relationship with Canada leaves
something to be desired. China recently implied that Canada is lagging
"

U.N. Charter art. 51.
Jack
Donnelly,
State
Sovereignty
and
Human
http://www.du.edu/-jdonnell/papers/hrsov%20v4a.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2008).
34 See

Rights,
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behind other nations with regard to its trade relationship with China, meaning
that China may further limit or suspend trade with Canada unless Canada
actively engages in behaviors demonstrating to China its desire to continue
trading. While these statements are likely nothing more than a Chinese
attempt to induce Canada to increase its trade with China, if they are true, it
means that Canada need not threaten to reduce trade with China over its
human rights standards, for maintaining the status quo in its relationship will
have the same result. Statements such as Harper's may only speed the
decline. Thus, it appears that China, too, makes efforts to shape the trade
policies of other nations.
The effect such legislation would have on China's ability to invest in and
secure rights to Canada's oil sands also merits discussion. Assuming that
there is as much crude oil in Alberta as projected, it will surely become an
integral source for satisfying numerous countries' energy needs. If Canada
does pass legislation limiting China's access to Canadian oil without
substantial change in China's human rights policies, China will have little
choice but to submit to Canada's demands. Furthermore, China's recent
decisions to invest in regions of the world that are frequently subject to
political instability increases the possibility that present sources of Chinese
oil may, in the future, no longer be available. Thus, it would appear that in
the world of securing energy, Canada might have a large and irresistible
carrot to dangle in front of China. Would Canada's demands in this context
rise to the level of sovereignty violations?
B. Policy Effectiveness
In examining policy effectiveness, it is essential to initially define
"effectiveness." Foreign relations often reflect a composition of a nation's
perspective in the areas of geo-politics, philosophy, and real politic. Those
relations manifest themselves through words and deeds alike, though nonaction is as significant as action. Analyzing a nation's foreign policy also
requires an appreciation for domestic realities and limits. Furthermore, it is
important to discern the intended audience of a particular policy. Henry
Kissinger, as described in Jim Mann's authoritative book on US-China
relations, was a practitioner of the "feign" with respect to the US foreign
affairs conducted during the Nixon years.35 It should be added that the "bob
and weave" and deceptions that were a Kissinger hallmark were intended for
domestic and international audiences alike.
In direct contrast, Prime Minister Harper's words appear to represent a
different school of thought, one predicated on "I mean what I say and I say
See

JIM MANN, ABOUT FACE: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S CURIOUS RELATIONSHIP wITH
CHINA, FROM NIXON TO CLINTON, (First Vintage Books, 1999).
35
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what I mean." In examining media reports and commentaries and speaking
with individuals from different sectors,36 the overwhelming impression is that
Prime Minister Harper, unlike Kissinger, was not engaging in the feign.
Rather, Harper was seeking to affect Chinese domestic policy so that they
reflect his notion of human rights.
On the assumption that this analysis is correct, what criteria should be
developed for determining the policy's effectiveness? In developing a matrix,
the following parameters are suggested:
1) What are the policy's goals?
2) Who is the intended audience?
3) Is the desired change realistic?
4) What are the consequences if the policy fails?
5) If the policy has been previously articulated, did it succeed or
fail and why?
6) What is the vehicle for influencing the suggested policy
change?
Based on the above matrix, the following answers serve as a convenient
road map in determining the effectiveness of Prime Minister Harper's policy.
The policy's goal - on the presumption that Harper is to be taken at face
value - is to directly affect change in China's human rights policy with
respect to Chinese nationals. But in order to be successful the goal must be
more clearly articulated. Harper does not represent a new Canadian
perspective; he is just the most recent to articulate it. And, as in the past, the
main critique of his demand on China is that it lacks specificity.
There are at least four intended audiences: the Chinese government, the
Chinese people, Canadian business leaders engaged in trade with China, and
the nations of the world. In analyzing audience impact, the requisite followup question is whether the impact on all four should be considered equally or
whether Harper's message is intended for one audience more than the others.
We suggest the latter and therefore propose the following order: the Chinese
government, Canadian businesses, the nations of the world, and the Chinese
people. With respect to the other identified audiences, particularly the nations
of the world, their importance (from a policy effectiveness perspective) is
36

Private conversations as preparation for the writing of this article.
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unclear. If they adopt Canada's principled position, then Harper can
subscribe to himself a modicum of success that will ultimately be tempered
when one (or more) nation determines that its national self-interests are best
served by engaging China in trade rather than attempting to reform Chinese
domestic policy.
The critical issue is whether Canada's demands are realistic. The "X"
factor in this equation is whether the Chinese government truly needs
Canadian oil. That is, if the Chinese are satisfactorily and consistently able to
procure foreign oil from elsewhere, then Canada's importance as a trading
partner is significantly reduced. In that event, the Canadian policy will be
"high on principle" while simultaneously "low on effectiveness."
C. ForeignPolicy
Turning to the consequences if the policy fails, as indicated earlier, there
is some indication that Canada's policy toward trade with China is already
failing from the Chinese perspective. If that is true, one could argue that
Harper's position, if it fails, is likely to only exacerbate an already struggling
relationship. From the perspective of Canadian businesses, they may argue
that a faltering relationship with China means Canada should do more to
repair a weak relationship, something that Harper's position surely does not
do.
From Machiavelli to Metternich, foreign relations have ultimately been a
reflection of a nation's self-interest; world order reflects a balance of
competing, sometimes converging, national interests. Whether principle is
relevant to realpolitik is an open question; however, it would seem that
economic interests outweigh matters of conscience even if individual nations
strive to develop a principled foreign policy. That is why the question of
intended audiences is so critical to this discussion.
The policy will have failed (from a Canadian perspective) if China
procures oil elsewhere and will therefore be able to politely (at best) listen to
Prime Minister Harper while duly ignoring his principled approach. The
losers? From an economic perspective, the oil speculators in specific and the
Canadian economy in general. The winners? China's other sources of oil. If
international trade is to be viewed as a zero sum game, then a principled
policy - or at least one that stakes a principled position - suggests an
approach devoid of compromise, and one potentially best expressed as long
on principle and short on practicality.
D. An Integrative Analysis: The Olympics - Will Circumstances Force
the Issue?
There is also an additional factor to be taken into consideration when
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analyzing Chinese human rights policy: the 2008 Olympics. Many have
expressed concern that the process of preparing Beijing for the Olympics will
necessitate a litany of human rights abuses including, but not limited to,
home demolition, restrictions on travel, and insufficient wages for workers.
Similarly, there are concerns that during the Olympics China's tight control
on freedom of expression will result in further human rights abuses. These
issues must be addressed from at least two different perspectives: Chinese
attitudes regarding the rights of the individual and the state's obligation with
respect to the individual and how human rights violations will "play" in the
court of international opinion. To work our way backwards - if the Chinese
government is perceived to have engaged in significant human rights
violations either before or during the Olympics, international public opinion
may force other nations to, at a minimum, address the egregious violations.
How serious must violations be in order for states to "violate Chinese
sovereignty" by interfering in internal Chinese matters is an open question,
but one that may be based on the Canadian model.
As mentioned earlier, China is in the midst of constructing an oil pipeline
in the westernmost region of the country to help address its oil needs.
Because the oil pipeline runs through Xinjiang, concern has also been raised
regarding the possibility of an al-Qaeda terrorist attack in the predominantly
Muslim province. The suggested timing: either as a run-up to the Olympics
or during the Games themselves. 37 With the world watching, would the
Chinese respond to such a hypothetical attack with their "gloves off' and
therefore, potentially, engage in egregious human rights violations? And if
so, would Canada's proposed method of protecting the human rights of
Chinese citizens be adopted if the international community chooses to get
involved? What would be the costs?
III. Conclusion
According to scholars, China's political history and philosophy suggest
that the regime not concern itself with domestic opposition to human rights
violations because the individual is expected to be subservient to the needs of
the state. In other words, if the state, in response to a terrorist attack on a vital
resource (oil) violates the individual human rights of a particular population
(Muslims), the general population will exercise restraint in its criticism of the
state. While clearly reflective of "lessons learned" from its Maoist past (the
Cultural Revolution is but one example of how the state or the Communist
Party aggressively responds to internal dissension), it gives the state
37 China: Exploiting the Uighur 'Terrorist Camp' Raid, Strategic Forecasting, Inc., Jan. 10,
2007, http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read-article.php?id=282716&selected=
Analyses.
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significant "wiggle room" from within with respect to how it conducts
domestic policy. While that may be the case, the question that stands before
us is whether other nations will adopt the Canadian model, or will "lip
service" be the preferred response in the name of "mutual business interests."
If history is an indicator (Santayana's "those who fail to learn from
history are doomed to repeat it" may, yet again, prove prophetic), then the
majority of the nations of the world will opt not to follow the Canadian
example. History is replete with examples of the turning of a blind eye, rather
than taking a principled stand. In this context, are we to view Canada's
stance as a violation of Chinese sovereignty or as a principled stand
reflective of the "higher moral ground?" The answer would seem to lie with
who is asking the question; from the Chinese perspective, the Canadian
position would seem to violate Chinese sovereignty whereas the Canadians
would, no doubt, argue that their principle supersedes sovereignty. The
question becomes whether these opposing views may meet somewhere in the
middle, as international trade, resources procurement, and the international
stage center more on China.

